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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
place undue burdens on the female worker in violation of her constitu-
tional right to equal protection.
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY-UNEMANCIPATED MINOR CHILD OF
DIVORCED PARENTS MAY SUE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT. Fugate v. Fu-
gate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). An unemancipated minor
sought damages in a wrongful death suit' against her father, alleging
that his negligent operation of an automobile caused the death of her
mother. Defendant and the deceased were divorced prior to the acci-
dent. The divorce decree gave the deceased custody of plaintiff and
granted visitation and temporary custody rights to defendant. The cir-
cuit court, in an evidentiary hearing, found that the suit had not dis-
rupted the harmonious relationship between plaintiff and defendant,2
but nevertheless dismissed the action on the basis of parental immu-
nity. The court of appeals transferred plaintiffs appeal' and the Mis-
souri Supreme Court held- The parental immunity doctrine does not
bar an unemancipated minor child's tort suit against a parent who, pur-
suant to a divorce decree, does not have general custody of the child at
the time the tort occurs.4
The parental immunity rule first appeared in the United States5 in
1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default
of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof,
then, and in every such case, the person who or the corporation which would have been
liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured, which damages may be sued for and recovered
(1) By ... minor children ... of the deceased
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1978) (amended 1979).
2. Witnesses at the hearing included defendant, plaintifis paternal grandmother, and a
close family friend. All testified that the parties' relationship was good both before and after the
suit was filed. Brief for Appellant at 2, Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
3. The Missouri Court of Appeals decided that the "statewide interest and importance" of
the matter required its transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. 582 S.W.2d at 664.
4. Id. at 669.
5. Apparently, there were no reported English cases of parent-child tort actions for negli-
gence. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 865 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1059 (1930); Comment, Tort,4c-
tions Between Members of the Famil;'-Husband& We-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 180
(1961).
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Hewelette v. George.6 In that case the Supreme Court of Mississippi
refused to award damages in a minor child's suit against her mother for
false imprisonment.7 The court based its decision on a "sound public
policy" to promote peace in the family and in society." Courts have
relied on Hewelette to bar suits by minors seeking damages from their
parents for cruel and inhumane treatment, 9 rape, t° and other torts."
Supporters of the parental immunity rule argue that tort actions by mi-
nor children against their parents disrupt family harmony and domestic
tranquility,' 2 hinder parental discipline and control,"3 and encourage
fraud and collusion.' 4
Judicial dissatisfaction with the strict application of the parental im-
munity rule produced numerous exceptions,' 5 which caused many ju-
6. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7. Id. at 710, 9 So. at 887. The mother confined the child to an insane asylum for eleven
days. The child sought damages for time lost from employment, mental pain and suffering, and
injury to her reputation. Id.
8. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. The court cited no precedent or authority for its decision.
9. McKelvey v. McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). The McKelvey court also
relied upon cases involving a husband's immunity from his wife's suit. .d. at 391, 77 S.W. at 665.
10. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,79 P. 788 (1905). The court stated that there would be "no
practical line of demarkation [sic]" if it allowed such suits. Id. at 244, 79 P. at 789.
11. Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) (action by minor against adoptive
parents for fraud and deceit); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966) (action by
minor children against father for alleged gross negligence in operation of automobile).
12. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Chastain v. Chastain,
50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968);
Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1969) (en banc); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67
(Okla. 1964); McKelvey v. McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). Critics of the family-harmony argument point to the inconsistency of
allowing parent-child property and contract actions but denying tort actions. See, e.g., Young v.
Wiley, 183 Ind. 449, 107 N.E. 278 (1914); McKern v. Beck, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641 (1920).
Critics also assert that tort suits have been allowed between siblings. See, e.g., Herrell v. Haney,
207 Tenn. 532, 341 S.W.2d 574 (1960); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518,29 A.2d 765 (1942); Treschman v. Treschman,
28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). Most
parent-child tort suits arise from automobile accidents. Some states have limited the immunity
rule to situations involving parental authority or discretion. See Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d
921 (Ky. 1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Other states have held
the immunity rule not applicable in situations involving negligent operation of an automobile,
See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970)
(en banc).
14. See, e.g., Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa.
287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). Contra, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d
445 (1950).
15. Courts allowed suits by a child against his parent, for example, in cases in which the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/18
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risdictions either to abolish the rule entirely or to limit severely its
application. 6 California, in Gibson v. Gibson, 7 abolished the rule and
substituted the "reasonably prudent parent" test. Courts generally al-
low recoveries when: the child, minor or not, is emancipated;18 the de-
fendant's conduct is willful and malicious;' 9 a master-servant
relationship exists between parent and child;20 the parent was engaged
in a business venture;2' or the minor sues the parent's estate.
22
The early development of the parental immunity rule in Missouri
was inconsistent. In Wells v. Wells 23 the Kansas City Court of Appeals
permitted a mother to sue her unemancipated minor son for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. The court rejected the family har-
mony argument because disruption of family harmony was not a bar to
contract or property actions between family members.24 Seven years
parent engaged in wilfull and malicious conduct or the parent and child had a master-servant
relationship. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 458, 263 S.W.2d
29, 32 (1953), mentions some of these exceptions, but neither approves nor disapproves of the
cases espousing them.
16. Rouley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786 (w.D. La. 1964); Xaphes v.
Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v.
Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970) (en banc); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d
648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Schenk
v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431,
161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); France v. A.P.A.
Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v.
Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
See generally 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 720 (1971); 76 DICK. L. REV. 623 (1971); 44 NOTRE DAME LAW.
1001 (1969).
17. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
18. Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954) (parent cannot bring suit against
minor child unless child is emancipated); Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en banc)
(plaintiff-minor child emancipated at time of accident may bring suit against her parent); Murphy
v. Murphy, 206 Misc. 228, 133 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (whether four-year-old child was
emancipated should be determined at trial; defendant-father's motion for summary judgment de-
nied).
19. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218
P.2d 445 (1950); Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960).
20. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (sixteen-year-old living at home with
parents injured while employed by father).
21. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (five-year-old boy allowed to sue
father for injuries from father's negligent operation of truck for business purposes).
22. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); Brower v. Webb, 5 Pa. D.
& C.2d 193 (C.P. 1955).
23. 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
24. Id. at 110.
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later,25 however, the Springfield Court of Appeals applied the parental
immunity rule and held that unless authorized by statute, a minor child
has no right of action against a parent for willful and malicious as-
sault.2 6
The Supreme Court of Missouri first explicitly accepted the parental
221immunity rule in 1953.27 In Baker v. Baker" a minor child sought
damages from her father for injuries resulting from her father's negli-
gent operation of an automobile.29 The court held that public policy
precluded a minor child from suing its parent in tort for mere negli-
gence.3°  Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri have
modified Baker, holding that a child may sue its parent in tort even for
simple negligence if the child is emancipated 3 or if the suit would not
"seriously disturb family relations." 32 The court has also implied that
the party relying on the parental immunity rule must carry the burden
of proof.33
In Fugate v. Fugate34 the Supreme Court of Missouri further defined
the scope of the parental immunity rule. The court rejected defendant's
contention that every tort action brought by an unemancipated minor
against its living parent should be prohibited as against the public pol-
25. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939). The court in Cook apparently
was unaware of Wells because it stated that it found no Missouri case on point. Id. at 997, 124
S.W.2d at 676.
26. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
27. Taylor v. Taylor, 360 Mo. 994, 232 S.W.2d 382 (1950). The court allowed a mother to
recover against her son in tort because the tort occurred when defendant was of legal age. The
court, however, implicitly approved of the parental immunity rule: "There is more reason to
apply the rule in a case where the child is a minor than where he is of age." Id. at 1000, 232
S.W.2d at 385.
28. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 458, 263 S.W.2d at 32.
31. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
32. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (court allowed minor to sue
the estate of his parent, reasoning that the harmonious-family argument was extinguished by the
parent's death).
33. Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972). The court held that a child bringing suit
against its parent should be allowed to present evidence to show either emancipation or that no
disruption of family relations would occur as a result of the suit. The court also affirmed the
Brennecke position that the parental immunity rule should apply "only when the court concludes
that to hold otherwise would seriously disturb the family relations and thus be contrary to public
policy." Id. at 402 (citing Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. 1960) (en banc)).
34. 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
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icy protecting family harmony.35 It reasoned that because parental im-
munity is a court-made rule, it is subject to modification based on the
court's perception of public policy. 36 Fugate followed a rule developed
in Brennecke v. Kipatrick37 and Bahr v. Bahr38 that viewed "any dis-
ruption in the tranquility of the domestic establishment"' 39 as a distur-
bance of family relations.4° The court found that the divorce of the
parents before the accident disrupted the family long before plaintiff
filed the lawsuit. 41 A new family unit, consisting of plaintiff and her
mother, formed after the divorce.42 The mother had custody of plain-
tiff and was responsible for her daily care.43 Upon divorce, defendant
surrendered rights to discipline of the child and to family association.'
At the time of the accident, plaintiff and defendant were not members
of the same family unit, and thus no family relationship required the
parental immunity rule.45 Fugate refused to extend the parental immu-
nity rule beyond the point necessary to "assist and support the func-
tioning of an existing family unit.146 The court indicated that under
"appropriate circumstances" the parental immunity rule should still
bar parent-child tort actions.47
The court correctly reasoned that because the divorce extinguished
the need to preserve family harmony, the parental immunity rule was
35. Id. at 665. The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the wrongful death statute
abrogated the parental immunity rule. Id. at 665-67.
36. Id. at 668.
37. 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en banc). See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
38. 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
39. 582 S.W.2d at 669 (citing Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en banc)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Defendant was obligated to pay child support and had temporary custody rights, but the
court found these factors insufficient to warrant consideration. Id. The court, however, left open
the possibility that relative rights of the noncustodial parent may be considered in allowing immu-
nity.
We are also cognizant of the fact that a noncustodial parent must perform parental du-
ties of care, discipline, etc., when the child is in that parent's temporary custody, and that
the relative rights and duties of the parties may result in a modification or denial of
recovery when the injury arises out of the performance of such duties. Those matters
will have to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 668.
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unjustifiable.48 The court avoided the harder question whether the pa-
rental immunity rule serves any useful purpose in modem society. The
traditional arguments-fraud and collusion,4 9 family harmony,50 and
parental discipline and control -no longer support the parental im-
munity rule.
Most parent-child tort actions are brought as a result of automobile
accidents. The prevalence of liability insurance52 reduces the possibil-
ity of family discord in those situations. In fact, family discord will
more likely result from an intrafamily contract or property suit in
which the loser bears the cost burden. The Missouri courts, however,
allow intrafamily contract and property actions without concern for
disruption of family relations. 3
The danger of fraud and collusion certainly exists in parent-child
lawsuits, but that danger is present whenever the parties to a suit are
close friends or family members. The danger itself does not justify a
rule that denies an entire class of litigants access to the courts.5 4 Dean
Prosser states: "the danger of fraud has been stressed, although it is
difficult to see why it is any greater, as between the parties themselves,
than in any other tort action involving an infant."55
The danger of interference with parental control and discipline is the
more logical justification for the parental immunity rule. The usual
parent-child tort, however, occurs outside the scope of parental disci-
pline and control. In Fugate, defendant's negligent operation of his car
precipitated the lawsuit;56 that conduct had no relation to parental dis-
cipline and control. The rule is unnecessary because it protects an un-
threatened interest.
The Supreme Court of California in Gibson v. Gibson57 abolished the
48. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
52. On the effects of insurance, see James, Accident Liability Reconsidered- The Impact of
Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
53. See Hubbard v. Hubbard, 140 Mo. 300,41 S.W. 749 (1897) (property rights); Goodrick v.
Harrison, 130 Mo. 263, 32 S.W. 661 (1895) (same); Jine v. Jine, 226 S.W. 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920)
(contract); Cole v. Fitzgerald, 132 Mo. App. 17, 111 S.W. 628 (1908) (same). See also note 21
supra.
54. Accord, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 865-66.
56. 582 S.W.2d at 664.
57. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
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rule, characterizing it as "a legal anachronism, riddled with exceptions
...lacking the support of authority and reason."5 8 The court in Fu-
gate should have followed Gibson. The parent-child relationship does
not require the parental immunity rule, but traditional views of negli-
gence applied to parent-child actions might interfere with parental con-
trol and discipline. 9 The California court adopted a "reasonably
prudent parent test."6 Adapted from common tort notions, the test
compares the defendant's actions to those of a reasonable and prudent
parent in similar circumstances.6' Scholars have recently praised the
substitution of this test for the parental immunity rule.62
By clinging to the modified parental immunity rule of Brennecke and
Bahr, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Fugate failed to define ade-
quately the scope of the remaining immunity. The court offered little
guidance in allowing the rule to apply "under appropriate circum-
stances." The future of the parental immunity rule in Missouri is un-
certain, and Missouri courts should join other states in the movement
away from the parental immunity doctrine.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLEGITIMACY--OHIO INTESTATE SUC-
CESSION LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. 9hite
v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979) (per curiam).
Decedent's will devised all of decedent's property to his wife, but failed
to provide for its disposition in the event that she did not survive him.
When the will failed, decedent's administrator brought an action to de-
termine decedent's heirs-at-law, joining appellant, who claimed to be
decedent's illegitimate daughter, as one of the defendants. The probate
judge held, as a matter of law, that appellant could not inherit from
decedent's estate because of her status as an illegitimate child.' The
58. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
59. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
60. Id., 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
61. Id.
62. See, Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to Personal
Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 661 (1979); Note, The 'Reasonable Parent" Standard- An
lternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976); 12 TULSA L.J. 545
(1977).
1. White v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, -, 391 N.E.2d 333, 333-34 (1979) (per curiam).
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